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Abstract
A theory of how agents can come to understand a language is pre-
sented. If understanding a sentence α is to associate an operator with
α that transforms the representational state of the agent as intended
by the sender, then coming to know a language involves coming to
know the operators that correspond to the meaning of any sentence.
This involves a higher order operator that operates on the possible
transformations that operate on the representational capacity of the
agent. We formalize these constructs using concepts and diagrams
analogous to category theory.
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1 Communication as operators on agent rep-
resentations
Let I be the interpretation of a language L. I maps signals α ∈ L to
operators I (α). An operator I (α) transforms representations R into new
representations I (α)(R) = Rα. Hence, I (α) is a transformation on trans-
formations, or what is known as a functor in category theory. Transfor-
mations are designated by arrows. A given interpretation I of a language
L shows how each sentence as message or more generally signal α of the
language transforms the representational state R of a receiver. In learning
a language, an agent starts in a state of total ignorance about the inter-
pretation I and gradually through interaction with its social environment
of other agents gains more and more information about the interpretation
itself. Thus, the learning of language involves yet another level of transfor-
mation, namely, it transforms the information about I . If I Ω represents
total ignorance about the actual interpretation I of the language L (The
interpretation is relative to a society since different societies could interpret
the same language differently) and I PI represents perfect information, then
the process of coming to understand a language involves a series of trans-
formations that take the agent from total non-understanding I Ω to perfect
understanding I PI or some state I X in between.
Viewed extensionally or set-theoretically (see [2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8]) the state
of uncertain about the interpretation I X is a set of possible interpretations
I 1, . . . ,I k(X). Viewed positively I X is a partial representation of the in-
terpretation, partial both in terms of the domain it covers as well as the
values of the mapping. So, for example, I X(α) may not map to a unique
representational operator and, instead only pick out a set of operators, or
viewed positively, a partial operator on agent representations1.
Coming to learn a language can then be viewed as a path or history
HI = I Ω = I Xt1 → I Xt2 → . . .→ I Xtz−1 → I Xtz = I PI
Each such a path HI is a possible path to coming to understanding a
language. Let ψI be the set of all possible paths to learning the interpretation
1The relationships to operators in quantum mechanics [5, 1] and statistical mechanics
[2] are noted
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I of a language L. Each transformation step in HI is associated with an
interaction between the agent A and the social environment M such that
(RA ⊗RM)t1 . . . (RA ⊗RM)tn(I
Ω) = I X
tn
In other words, the interactions on I X progressively reduce the uncer-
tainty the agent A has about the interpretation I of the language L. This
means these interactions presuppose a meta operator that acts on the repre-
sentation an agent A has of the interpretation I X . The meta operator thus
maps the possible interpretations (allowed by the agent’s available meta-
interpretation information) to a new set of possible interpretations.
A⊗M : I Ω
2
→ I Ω
2
where I Ω
2
is the power set (set of all subsets of I Ω ).
This means that the agent has to have a meta-representational operator
capacity that enables it to make the meta-representational transformations
necessary for learning the meaning of a language. Granted, the implemen-
tation of such meta-transformations in humans may be messy, complex and
downright incomprehensible having themselves been formed by the vagaries
and randomness the ultimate meta-transform-evolution. Still, no matter how
complex, they are meta-transformations and as such can be studied from the
abstract perspective of set theory and category theory.
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2 The meta space of all possible interpreta-
tions
I
Ω =


I 1 =


I 1(α1) : R ⇒ α
I 1
1 (R)
...
I 1(αn) : R ⇒ α
I 1
n (R)
...
I k =


I k(α1) : R ⇒ α
I k
1 (R)
...
I k(αn) : R ⇒ α
I k
n
(R)
(1)
For any I i ∈ I Ω the interpretation maps I i signals α ∈ L to operators
on RΩ. Where RΩ is the set of all possible representational states of an
agent. We call RΩ the representational capacity of the agent. Hence,
I
i : RΩ ⇒ RΩ
ψΩ = {X : X ⊂ I Ω} = I Ω
2
is the power set of I Ω and is the set of all possible meta-information states
about the interpretation I .
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